

## ***The Politics of Creation***

Peter Hallward (2006), *Out of this world : Deleuze and the philosophy of creation*, London, Verso.

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“*Comprendre et ne pas s’indigner*”: this has been said to be the last word of philosophy. I believe none of it; and, had I to choose, I should much prefer, when in the presence of crime, to give my indignation rein and not to understand.’

-H. Bergson, 1914<sup>1</sup>

Peter Hallward’s study of Deleuze aims “to go right to the heart of [his] philosophy”<sup>2</sup> through the charting of one “broadly consistent course”, that of the implications of Deleuze’s presumption that Being is creativity. In charting such a course, Hallward is able indeed to provide what is a thorough and consistent interpretation of the work of Deleuze, showing admirable familiarity with both bibliographical and thematic aspects of the Deleuzian system. In asserting that there is an essentially stable project throughout Deleuze’s philosophical development, Hallward draws on the full resources of Deleuze’s writing across (almost) all major domains, and there is certainly some truth to his claim that the guiding theme of Deleuze’s philosophy is creativity. If philosophy is to be seen as the creation of concepts, surely our primary task is to unravel the concept

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1 From the essay, *Life and Matter at War*, taken from Bergson, H. (1915), *The Meaning of the War*, available at [www.gutenberg.org](http://www.gutenberg.org), hereafter *LMW*.

2 Hallward, Peter (2006), *Out of this world : Deleuze and the philosophy of creation*. London, Verso, p. 1, hereafter *OW*.

of creation. In performing this task of identifying both conceptual slippages and continuities between the various terms and periods of Deleuze's writings, Hallward is indeed able to present the work of Deleuze as providing a coherent interpretation of Being. In doing so, Peter Hallward rejects an explanation of Deleuze's system based on the parallels with modern scientific models, instead rightly resituating Deleuze within the tradition of philosophy. Fundamental to this is the recognition of the importance of Bergson as a key precursor, which means that Hallward does not fall into the trap of interpreting Deleuze as a thinker of the multiple through a false reading of Deleuzian difference as diversity. In his interpretation of Deleuze, however, Hallward displays a degree of hostility to what he takes to be both the aims and the consequences of Deleuze's ontology. In his focus on creation, which 'precedes' the individual itself as differentiated, Hallward will argue, Deleuze is only able to fulfil his magical formula, "PLURALISM = MONISM"<sup>3</sup> by subordinating the organism to the process of creation itself. This is because creation, which generates the plurality which Deleuze wishes on the surface to take account of, cannot itself partake in this plurality, for to do so would be to reduce creation to pure actuality itself, and the actual, Hallward argues, is not real. The task of the organism, if we are to follow Deleuze, is therefore to "recapture in individual existences, and follow to the source from which it emanates, the particular ray that, conferring upon each of them its own nuance, reattaches it thereby to the universal light."<sup>4</sup> This process, which Hallward characterises through the idea of subtraction, is the key to a new relation between the fields of philosophy, science, and art. Whilst art "dilates our perception,"<sup>5</sup> opening us up to the possibility of experiencing the virtuality of the world, its effect can only be negative. As the work of Francis Bacon shows, the aim of art may be to paint forces, but ultimately this can only be achieved through the trace which is left on the canvas. "Art 'enriches our present but scarcely enables us to go beyond it' into the virtual continuity of time as a continuous whole."<sup>6</sup> Art is thus this process of following to the source our own individual existences. To move beyond this, however, we require philosophy, the "smile without the cat, as it were."<sup>7</sup> On Hallward's reading, it is philosophy's aim to

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3 OW, p. 29, referencing *Bergsonism*, p. 29 and *Thousand Plateaus*, p. 20-21

4 OW, p. 85, quoting *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 305

5 OW, p. 133

6 OW, p. 133

7 OW, p. 132, quoting *What is Philosophy*, p. 29

extract from the state of affairs the pure (virtual) event, and thus to sever ties with actuality altogether. In this move, philosophy becomes mysticism, “fully spiritualised and dematerialised,”<sup>8</sup> and thus a moment of pure affirmation. Reliant on this movement are all of the positive traits of Deleuze’s philosophy,<sup>9</sup> but this also leads to one particular trait which makes Deleuze’s position politically absolutely untenable. The move to a philosophy of the virtual means a move to a philosophy of absolute affirmation, within which the political action of the creature in the face of oppression no longer has meaning. One escapes the world through a line of flight which takes ‘one’ (if this term can still find any applicability) to the extra-worldly. The consequences of this for political action seem devastating for Hallward. On the one hand, any idea of such a thing as solidarity, or even opposition, seems to become impossible. If our aim is to return to the universal light (or even simply if there is such a universal light), then the possibility of either of these stances, which rely on our relations as creatures to other creatures, becomes impossible. The singularity of creation obscures the possibility of any kind of difference between things, as all things are really one, making relation impossible. Instead, we simply have difference differentiating itself. Action is dissolved in the whole. “By doing what it can, an individual only provides a vessel for the power that works through it, which alone acts – or rather, which alone *is*. What impels us to ‘persevere in our being’ has nothing to do with us as such.”<sup>10</sup> What this makes problematic is any kind of genuine engagement with concrete political situations, at a time when such an engagement is clearly called for. Instead of this, on Hallward’s reading, Deleuze is arguing that one should move to pure contemplation of the world. “The real preoccupation of [Hallward’s] book concerns the value of this advice.”<sup>11</sup>

Moving from description to evaluation of *Out of this World*, Peter Hallward’s book provides a persuasive interpretation of Deleuze’s work, and makes a real contribution to the study of Deleuze, showing how the various branches of knowledge which Deleuze discusses and delineates interrelate, in particular showing an incisive understanding of the role art

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8 *OW*, p. 133.

9 *OW*, chapter one does a good job of highlighting these traits, and their interrelations.

10 *OW*, p. 163.

11 *OW*, p. 7.

plays within Deleuze's system of difference. As Peter Hallward himself makes clear from the start, however, *Out of this World* is not meant to be read as a guidebook to Deleuze's thought. Instead, in developing his interpretation of Deleuze, Hallward is providing himself with the tools for a critical assessment of the value of Deleuze in a world where action is desperately needed. Whilst Hallward's interpretation of Deleuze is coherent and rich, it downplays large thematic aspects of his system which are inconsistent with the thrust of Hallward's argument. My aim in this review article will be to see how reconsidering these aspects of Deleuze's system may be able to assuage some of the worries Peter Hallward holds about the concrete implications of becoming Deleuzian. Ultimately, I feel that the conclusions to which Hallward is drawn may indeed be valid, but without a more sympathetic relation to these other aspects of Deleuze's position, these conclusions remain ungrounded. The key areas which I wish to look at will be the two themes of difference and affirmation as they play out in Deleuze's logic of multiplicities. In an afterword written in 1988 to his work, *Bergsonism*, Deleuze calls for a return to Bergson, and it is this theme which I believe is key to understanding Deleuze's philosophy. Importantly, much of what Hallward says of Deleuze, he also applies to Bergson, recognising the key role which Bergson plays in the development of both technical and thematic aspects of Deleuze's philosophy of difference. I think the difficulties of Hallward's interpretation can be resolved by paying attention to these three themes which Deleuze believes are necessary for "the transformations of life and society."<sup>12</sup>

## Intuition

As Hallward notes, the inspiration for the two key categories of Deleuze's work, the virtual and the actual, are developed by Bergson. Beyond this, Deleuze recognises three aspects of Bergson's philosophy which are key to his transformative project. It is these three aspects, the theory of intuition, the theory of multiplicities, and a reconfiguration of the relation of science to metaphysics, which I feel are misstated in *Out of this World*. Whilst all three of these points are interrelated, we shall begin by outlining Bergson's theory of intuition. Whilst intuition sounds like a

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<sup>12</sup> Deleuze, G. (1988), *Bergsonism*, Tomlinson, H. & Habberjam, B. (trans.), Zone Books, USA, p. 114, hereafter *B*.

process well in line with Hallward's charges of mysticism, intuition refers to the process whereby one moves from an understanding of the world in terms of a spatial multiplicity to one of duration. As Hallward notes, for Bergson, one's 'creatural' relations to the world are governed fundamentally by pragmatic considerations. For Bergson, our everyday understanding of the world is governed by the notions of discrete bodies and geometrical relations, something akin to Descartes' notion of substance. Such a relation holds, for Bergson, because what governs the correspondence of our categories to those of the world is not truth, but efficacy. The organism which can understand the world in such a way as to allow its effective manipulation survives, and it is through understanding the world in geometrical terms that one is able to manipulate the world, and thereby survive within it. In understanding the world in terms of geometrical structures and discrete bodies, we are able to apply our understanding to the world through the techniques of geometry and measure. In doing so, however, there is a tendency, which is also exhibited by the world itself, towards a spatialisation of time. The result would therefore seem to be to make the intuition of duration impossible, as is shown through an analysis of Zeno's paradoxes, or Russell's rejection of the idea of duration on the basis of logical considerations alone. The insight picked up by both Deleuze and Bergson, however, is that we *do have* an intuition of duration, and it is this which makes it both possible and necessary for philosophers such as Zeno and Russell to deny this intuition. We may here draw a contrast between the 'scientific' understanding of the world, in which we may progress along the line of time as fast as we choose, and the durational understanding of time, highlighted by Bergson through the example of the sugar water. In waiting for the sugar to dissolve in the water, I am confronted with an event of a duration which must take time to complete. This is the opening to another conception of time, which cannot be represented in the purely metric terms of scientific analysis. As Deleuze puts it, "intuition, as [Bergson] understands it methodically, already presupposes duration."<sup>13</sup> It is from this point that the method of intuition begins, through an attempt at the suspension of the categories of analysis which overlay and interfere with this intuition. That which is suspended for Deleuze is both a habit of thought and an image of thought. We will return to the question of habit later in our discussion. It is the method of intuition which would seem to drive Hallward to associate the term

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13 *B*, p. 13

subtraction with Deleuze's method, as a process whereby the creatural is put out of action by the creative. We can see that the idea of the creative is what is at the beginning and end of Bergson's method, and we can see how the notion of subtraction can be understood through this putting out of play of the habits of thought developed by the creature. There is, however, another sense to intuition which is not captured by either of Hallward's notions of subtraction or abstraction, notably the end result of this process, whereby we arrive at a positive theory of duration. This is given for Deleuze by the theory of multiplicities.

## Multiplicities

From the first aspect of Bergson's philosophy which should be taken up in any renewed Bergsonism, we move to the second, the logic of multiplicities. We have already given some characteristics of the first multiplicity through its characterisation in terms of geometry and extension. This is the multiplicity of the understanding. From these characteristics comes the assertion by Bergson, supported by Deleuze, that within the multiplicity of pure space, any creativity is impossible, as once we are dealing with that which is constituted, all that can change is the relations between the constituted elements. "A group of elements which has gone through a state can therefore always find its way back to that state, if not by itself, at least by an external cause able to restore everything to its place. This amounts to saying that any state of the group can be repeated as often as desired, and consequently that the group does not grow old."<sup>14</sup> We instead merely have alterations in the organisation of bodies, rather than the generation of genuine novelty; displacement rather than creation. This first idea of a multiplicity is the idea of a Euclidean multiplicity, and is the multiplicity to be rejected. Whilst the method of subtraction - subtraction of habit - leads us away from a conception of the world purely governed by this first kind of multiplicity, pure actuality in Deleuze's terms, that which is left after this moment is not in any sense of the word *less* than the actual. Let us look at an example from Bergson which clarifies this relation:

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<sup>14</sup>Bergson, H. (1984), *Creative Evolution*, Mitchell, A. (trans.), University of America, USA, p. 8, hereafter *CE*.

‘If I choose a volume in my library at random, I may put it back on the shelf after glancing at it and say, “This is not verse.” Is this what I have really seen in turning over the leaves of the book? Obviously not. I have not, and I never shall see, an absence of verse. I have seen prose.’<sup>15</sup>

As Bergson goes on to argue, it makes no sense to posit a formless language to which is somehow added either poetry or prose. Instead what is encountered is a different kind of order to the one expected. In like manner, it makes no sense to consider the actual as form given matter or matter given form. Instead we have a relation between two different kinds of order, on the one hand the order of pure actuality, the first multiplicity, and on the other pure virtuality, a multiplicity different in kind. In this context, one cannot simply ‘subtract’ one kind of multiplicity in order to discover the other. This recognition of the two kinds of order is implicit in the method of intuition itself, which would not function if duration was merely the absence of space. Whilst Hallward seems to recognise this point in his criticisms of Žižek, for whom virtuality in the early Deleuze is straightforwardly a moment of extinction,<sup>16</sup> as well as his discussion of the differential calculus, the tendency to regard virtuality as somehow less than actuality forms the basis of his interpretation of the understanding of virtuality as being the death of the organised body rather than the discovery of the body without organs (but with order). Whilst Hallward claims to provide an analysis of what he calls subtraction, for Bergson, this method would be one of addition, the concept of actuality combined with the concept of negation.

When we looked at the first kind of multiplicity and asked what differentiation means in this context, differentiation came down to the relative positions of bodies within a space. Change is defined purely in terms of displacement. The second kind of multiplicity, which Deleuze takes from Riemann (Deleuze will claim that Bergson was familiar with Riemannian geometry), instead takes as primary the notion of space itself. Here, change is defined through deformations intrinsic to the spatiality of the multiplicity. Whilst one can provide a rigorous mathematical understanding of such a space (and I think this possibility is key to

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<sup>15</sup> *CE*, p. 220.

<sup>16</sup> *OW*, p. 87.

Deleuze's philosophy), we can get a sense of what Deleuze is talking about by looking at Sartre's rejection of the idea of the transcendental ego which Sartre replaces with what Deleuze describes as an "impersonal transcendental field, not having the form of a synthetic personal consciousness or a subjective identity."<sup>17</sup> For Kant, it is essential to the possibility of thinking a manifold that we posit a subject. "It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations."<sup>18</sup> The reason for this is that in all perception, we are confronted by a multiplicity of actual elements which make up the manifold. If we are to see these elements as somehow related to each other, we need some kind of unifying framework, as "a set of distinct thoughts of the elements of the whole can never be equivalent to the thought of the whole itself."<sup>19</sup> What is required in this case is the addition of a structure which brings these elements into relation with one another, which will play a merely formal role in this process of synthesis, in this case the transcendental ego. It is this which allows the transition from the multiple to the multiplicity. What Sartre recognises instead, borrowing from results from both *Gestalt* psychology and Bergsonism, is that the distinct elements which together make up the manifold in fact unify themselves transversally through the characteristic that the events of the manifold do not merely appear as discrete elements, as the objects in the field take their own time to unfold, meaning that the manifold possesses its own order. Rather than requiring a formal framework of association, they bleed into one another as they take time to unfold. The world, in taking time to unfold itself, therefore has a natural unity provided by the duration of this unfolding. Once we recognise that the world has an order to itself, we no longer require the transcendental ego as an ordering principle. In fact, the introduction of the transcendental ego prevents the recognition of the order of the world, as for Sartre, the two kinds of order are fundamentally different. Whereas the transcendental ego provides order through the coordination of relations between discrete parts, the natural order of the world is closer to the interpenetration of events. What this means is that if we were to employ the notion of a transcendental ego, then we would necessarily misunderstand this nature, as the precondition

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<sup>17</sup>Deleuze, G. (1989), *The Logic of Sense*, Lester, M. & Stivale, C. (trans.), Athlone Press, UK, p. 98.

<sup>18</sup>Kant, I. (1965), *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kemp Smith, N. (trans.), St. Martin's Press, USA, p. 152.

<sup>19</sup>Allison, H. (2004), *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, Yale University Press, USA, p. 164.

for the functioning of the transcendental ego is a field of discrete elements to be related, so that its application would involve a necessary process of disordering before reordering. This reduction of the continuous to the discrete multiplicity always remains a possibility, however. The reason that I bring up this move against the transcendental ego, which Deleuze claims is 'decisive', is that it cuts to the heart of the idea of affirmation at play in the work of Deleuze. What Sartre shows is the possibility of escaping the argument which Deleuze sees in thinkers such as Schopenhauer, which *does* lead to the kind of contemplative withdrawal which Peter Hallward will no longer find in Deleuze: "When one no longer says I, individuation also ceases, and where individuation ceases, so too does all individual singularity. Since groundlessness lacks both individuality and singularity, it is therefore necessarily represented as devoid of any difference."<sup>20</sup>

What Kant presents with the concept of the transcendental subject is the paradigm case of the (Euclidean) spatial multiplicity; the function of the ego is effectively to provide a space for the discrete elements to come into relations with one another. What Sartre recognises is the possibility of what Deleuze will characterise as a Riemannian concept of multiplicity. Whilst the structure of this second multiplicity is, as Hallward rightly notes, one in which the logic of relation and negation no longer applies, this does not mean that there is in any sense less differentiation within this multiplicity. We no longer have a multiplicity of elements which can be brought together in a relation of solidarity by a process of demarcation and collection of entities within an extensive area. Instead, something like solidarity involves the coalescence of interpenetrative events which together intrinsically give the nature of the group. As the categories of negation, of defining a thing as this-and-not-that, which one finds applying to entities in the midst of a Euclidean space now no longer apply, we instead require a new concept of unity, and this is provided through differential, rather than discrete relations, as within a Riemannian virtual multiplicity, there is no space apart from its singularities through which to define relations of exclusion and inclusion which Deleuze takes to be at the heart of the use of negation within Euclidean actual multiplicities. The singularity of the virtual does indeed mean the end of the creature as distinct, but this does not mean the end of

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<sup>20</sup> Deleuze, G. (1994), *Difference and Repetition*, Patton, P. (trans.), Athlone Press, UK, p. 276, hereafter *DR*.

all differentiation unless we equate differentiation with negation. Once again, the idea of subtraction must be rejected as this notion is incomprehensible across two multiplicities which differ in kind. In failing to recognise this point, Hallward allies himself with Hegel, repeating Hegel's charge against Spinoza that within a system of affirmation, the individual dissolves into the homogeneity of the absolute. He asserts this even though recognising that for Deleuze, the absolute cannot be seen as homogeneous. It is precisely this charge that Deleuze attempts to refute with his argument that a true concept of difference, rather than difference between concepts, is required if we are to escape representationalism.

### **Science and Metaphysics**

The last of the trinity of ideas that Deleuze takes as key for a return to Bergsonism is a renewed relation between science and metaphysics. Hallward downplays the relation between Deleuze and science for two reasons, one good, and one bad. On the one hand, as Hallward points out, the emphasis on the scientific aspect of Deleuze's thought can obscure the fact that Deleuze's work is situated clearly within the field of philosophy, in particular, Bergson and Spinoza. In making a decision to downplay the scientific relations of Deleuze's thought, Peter Hallward is therefore able to open up a whole series of discussions about Deleuze's place and coordination with figures from the history of philosophy. One must make a distinction between the specific scientific content of Deleuze's thinking, and the general relation to the sciences Deleuze is proposing, however. Whilst Hallward mentions this relation and its connection to philosophy at the conclusion of his work, it is important to note that science plays an important role which counterbalances the tendencies towards virtuality which Hallward has highlighted. Thus, whereas art traces a path from actuality towards virtuality, science inverts this direction, tying the virtual to specific states of affairs. What is interesting about Deleuze's discussion of science is not that it reinstates science, but rather that it calls forth a new relation of science and philosophy. Bergson's analogy taken from the differential calculus makes clear what this new relation entails.<sup>21</sup> If we take the case of a simple curve, two possible representations of this curve are possible. On the one hand, we can see the curve as a simple, continuous line which defines a certain trajectory. This is in a sense the

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<sup>21</sup> *CE*, p. 31.

interpretation of the line under modern geometry, as Bergson here recognises. With any such line, however, it is always possible to decompose the line into an infinite series of infinitesimally short straight segments. Here, what is taken as simple is not the unity of the curve, but rather the elements which are taken to form the structure of the curve itself. It should be clear for the tendency of the discussion that here Bergson is equating the original, continuous curve with the creative, and the analytical procedure with the spatial. Taking the curve as a series of straight lines means that the simplicity is replaced by an impossibly great degree of complexity, as well as falsifying the phenomenon itself, which is to be understood as continuous. What is important is that Bergson does not reject the spatial in his move to the durational. Instead he calls for a reevaluation which puts both of these features in their proper places. “And, so far as we can see, the procedure by which we should pass from the definition of a certain vital action to the system of physico-chemical facts which it implies would be like passing from the function to its derivative, from the equation of the curve to the equation of the tangent giving its instantaneous direction.”<sup>22</sup> Virtuality does not replace actuality for Bergson, or in fact for Deleuze, but rather gives sense to it.

This brings us to the title of Hallward’s book, *Out of this World*. As I have tried to show, much of the force of Hallward’s argument comes from the idea that in moving away from actuality, we are forced to give something up, in the form of solidarity, action, and relation. He thinks it is these kinds of relations to the world which are given up by the move to the Deleuzian interpretation of being. Following Heidegger, we need to recognise, however, that an understanding of what the world is to which we are relating is fundamental to our judgement of the relationship we are to take to it. Again we can say with Heidegger that this consideration must be triggered by some kind of event. It is when the key sticks, and my typing is interrupted that I notice the relation to my keyboard which I previously held was not one of a simple relation to an object standing over and against me, but rather one of involvement and concern. The failure of my relation to the world as ready-to-hand opens me up to the understanding that that in fact was a definitive characteristic of my being-in-the-world. The situation, as I have tried to show in my discussion of the method of intuition, is similar for Deleuze, hence the emphasis on the idea of shock in his system. Such a preliminary intuition of the failure of

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<sup>22</sup> *CE*, p. 32.

the description of the world in terms of pure actuality drives us to a conception of the world which recognises its virtuality also. But in this case, it makes no sense to talk of a move out of “this” world, as the movement itself is the opening of a new conception of the world itself. To talk of a movement out of this world is to mistake this movement to a more adequate ontology of the world itself for a rejection of actuality in favour of virtuality. Whilst from the outside of Deleuze’s thinking, if one does not see the limitations of actuality, such a move will seem like a pure moment of transcendence, and whilst Hallward recognises that univocity and immanence are fundamental to Deleuze’s interpretation of the world, he is constantly straining against this interpretation with his references to the spiritual tendencies of Deleuze’s philosophy. These tendencies are to be found in his thinking, but their purpose is largely to bring about the kind of transformation which we saw Bergson proposing in his philosophy of science; a recognition that without virtuality, actuality becomes senseless. As Deleuze frequently notes, the object is double, both virtual and actual, and in both of these determinations it is real. It is only if we understand both the virtual and the actual through the categories of actuality that we arrive at the sharp separation which Hallward wishes to draw. Rather than recognise the virtual and actual as fixed states we should recognise them as tendencies, between which art, science and thought traverse, real articulations of being, the difference in kind coming about through the difference in degree. Without this, Deleuze’s discussion of science becomes puzzling, insofar as he claims that it inverts the direction of art. More than this, in tracing a path to actuality, which on Hallward’s reading is the unreal, it is difficult to see how science could have any authentic meaning whatsoever. In fact, it is only through the interplay of these two aspects of being that creativity, what Hallward takes to be the central feature of Deleuze’s philosophy, becomes possible. As the issue of creativity is tied to that of action, I will discuss both of these together.

### **Politics and Action**

The difficulty with the idea of action is that if it is to be understood purely in terms of actuality then, for Deleuze, and also on Hallward’s reading, action becomes entirely devoid of creativity. This is the force of Deleuze’s analysis of the image of thought. Actuality involves the mere

recombination of elements. Thus the problem to be solved by an action becomes reduced to a classroom exercise. “The master sets a problem, our task is to solve it, and the result is accredited true or false by a powerful authority.”<sup>23</sup> What is important here is not the authority which justifies the solution, but rather that the solution has already been understood in the problem being posed. In setting the problem, the master verifies the existence of a solution. The solution is simply the recombination of elements. Thus what we talk of as action purely invoking concepts of actuality would be for Deleuze something more like habit or behaviour. Whilst everything takes place on the same plane, all we can have is the most bare repetition of the juxtaposition of elements. Instead of this idea of a purely actual relation to things, Deleuze proposes the necessity of a moment of virtuality within the problematic itself. Understanding the problematic as a virtuality means that the solution to the problem, in the form of an actuality, belongs to a different order, or aspect of being. Thus the solution generated is different in kind from the problem. If we take Deleuze’s example of learning to swim,<sup>24</sup> an example once again taken from Bergson, we find that what is at play is not the bare repetition of actions, but rather “an innate or acquired practical familiarity with signs.”<sup>25</sup> The act of learning to swim cannot be simply the mechanical repetition of certain actions (the ‘do as I do’ of the bad teacher), but must rather be the recognition that one is forming an interpenetrative relationship with the event of the wave itself. True action involves the actual solution of a virtual problem. It is this movement which takes us beyond mere habit, or mere repetition. In fact, it is this movement which is the key to the central concept in Hallward’s interpretation of Deleuze. We have ruled out the possibility of creativity as involving pure actuality, as this would lead to pure repetition, or, in Bergson’s terms, pure displacement. Creativity is instead to be found in this interrelation between actuality and virtuality. What makes the solution a creative solution is that it is different in kind from the virtuality which creates it. Of course, once we accept that creativity involves both virtuality and actuality, and that it is this which unifies the virtual and actual, then the question of the world out of which Deleuze is proposing to go no longer makes sense. In fact the world of Deleuze cannot be understood without both of these aspects carrying weight. As Hallward emphasises, there is a tendency in Deleuze to prioritise the virtual over

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23 *DR*, p. 158.

24 *DR*, p. 22.

25 *DR*, p. 23.

the actual. The meaning of this priority is not to escape actuality, but rather to override the force of habit by which the intellect tends to understand in terms of actuality alone. All too often *Out of this World* talks of creativity as if it was a property of virtuality, whereas in fact it is a process of transformation. Bergson puts this forward in a view of society in his essay, *Life and Matter at War*:

What would happen if the mechanical forces, which science had brought to a state of readiness for the service of man, should themselves take possession of man in order to make his nature material as their own? What kind of world would it be if this mechanism should seize the human race entire, and if the peoples, instead of raising themselves to a richer and more harmonious diversity, as *persons* may do, were to fall into the uniformity of *things*? What kind of society would that be which should mechanically obey a word of command mechanically transmitted; which should rule its science and its conscience herewith?<sup>26</sup>

Our response to this situation is not to be conceived of as one of rejection of materiality, but rather of making sure that mechanism is understood in relation to virtuality. In the light of this, our opposition to understanding of the world as pure actuality is not to consist of a withdrawal from the world, to become a beautiful soul. Rather, what is required is direct engagement. In his discussion of the First World War, Bergson writes:

On the one side, there were forces spread out on the surface; on the other, there was force in the depths. On one side, mechanism, the manufactured article which cannot repair its own injuries; on the other, life, the power of creation which makes and remakes itself at every instant.<sup>27</sup>

Thus, for both Bergson and Deleuze, creation is intimately tied to action; in fact, it is both the motor and cause of action. Deleuze's philosophy is "geared to the indiscernible and imperceptible"<sup>28</sup> only in order to allow a return to action freed from habit. I have tried to argue

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<sup>26</sup> LMW.

<sup>27</sup> LMW.

<sup>28</sup> OW, p. 86.

here that Hallward's rejection of Deleuze rests on a misconception of several aspects of his philosophy. First, Hallward does not take seriously the idea that creation takes place between the virtual and the actual. This leads him to misinterpret Deleuze's focus on virtuality as a rejection of actuality, rather than as a move to open the possibility of a genuine understanding of the actual. Second, Hallward does not recognise the import of Deleuze's claim that the virtual is not to be seen as an undifferentiated abyss. What Deleuze is providing is a theory of two different multiplicities, and two different logics. Whilst Deleuze does reject the idea of relations between virtual singularities (conceived of as we might conceive of actual relations), this does not mean that the virtual is not differentiated. When Deleuze writes that the virtual "is not multiple, it is One, in conformity with *its* type of multiplicity"<sup>29</sup> this does not exclude the fact that within this singular multiplicity, there are a multitude of different durations. Rather, just as the actual is defined through relation, the virtual is through interpenetration. "All Ideas coexist, but they do so at points, on the edges, and under glimmerings which never have the uniformity of a natural light...Ideas are distinguished from one another, but not at all in the same manner as forms and the terms in which these are incarnated."<sup>30</sup> If one does not understand this, the move to virtuality will be seen as one of subtraction rather than as creation. Related to this, for Hallward, Deleuze's rejection of actuality is also a rejection of action. As I have tried to show, for Deleuze, an understanding of virtuality is entailed by any true action that moves beyond mere habit. Ultimately, Hallward's worry seems to be that in accepting the reality of the virtual, we no longer govern ourselves, as that which is responsible for us is different in kind from us. We are the enaction of the virtual, rather than actors ourselves. Whilst finding ourselves in this position is a constant danger for anyone who takes Deleuze's ontology seriously, it is only truly problematic if we fail to see the virtual and actual as two aspects of the same reality. The formula with which we began, 'pluralism = monism,' captures this intuition, but to forget this formula is to betray another fundamental aspect of Deleuze's philosophy, the univocity of being. For Deleuze, all action within the world brings this point back to us, as it is a precondition of all action that we are, if not the same flesh, the same event. It is only if we forget this insight that Hallward's proposition, that Deleuze can take us 'out of this world,' becomes comprehensible.

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<sup>29</sup> *B*, p. 85.

<sup>30</sup> *DR*, p. 187.

Peter Hallward's intent in *Out of this World* is laudable, and the insights into the obscurities of Deleuzian metaphysics are frequently incisive. In providing an interpretation of Deleuze that takes proper account of the movement towards the virtual which is a definite tendency of his system, he provides a necessary counterpoint to the interpretations which consider solely the actual. In pushing the balance too far the other way, however, the overall interpretation of the work suffers. The real aim of the book is not to discuss the 'truth' of Deleuze's account of metaphysics, but rather the 'value'. This opens him up to two challenges which, I think, in this book he does not meet. First, to attribute value to something, one must discern what it is that one is valuing. It is this challenge I have tried to raise in this review article through a focus on those features of Deleuze's metaphysics which are underplayed or absent in Hallward's interpretation. The tendencies which Hallward sees in the Deleuzian view of the world are also present in his metaphysics, and Peter Hallward brings these to the fore admirably. The second challenge to his project as I see it comes from his raising questions only in terms of the consequences of Deleuze's position. Even if one agrees that Deleuze's politics is ultimately valueless, if Deleuze's metaphysics is the metaphysics of the world, then Deleuze's politics is also the politics of the world. Without moving from the value of Deleuzianism to its veracity, I do not see how a project such as Hallward's can succeed.